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INTRODUCTION 
The use of economic sanctions by sender states and institutions is an instrument to force target 
states to abandon their undesirable behaviour or to comply with expected international standards. 
Economic sanctions can be defined as a way to “lower the aggregate economic welfare of a target 
state by reducing international trade in order to coerce the target government to change its political 
behaviour.”   1
 The ultimate goal of economic sanctions can be described as “actions initiated by one or 
more international actors (the “senders”) against one or more others (the “receivers”)” with the 
purpose of punishing the “receivers by depriving them of some value and/or make the receivers 
comply with certain norms the senders deem important.”  This goal can for instance be reached by 2
restricting trade and financial transactions.  
 Both Iran and North Korea have been sanctioned by the United States (hereafter U.S.) and 
the United Nations Security Council (hereafter Security Council). On the one hand, these two 
countries show similarities in their government’s political stance towards the development and use 
of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the countries differ in the fact that the economic sanctions 
imposed on Iran have led to a successful outcome, whereas they have had little effect on North 
Korea.  
 This research will answer the following question: why have economic sanctions been 
successful in Iran and why are they not working in North Korea? 
  
After providing background information on the sanctions that have been imposed on Iran and North 
Korea, existing literature will be applied to both cases in an attempt to answer the above-mentioned 
question. 
 Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 90-136.1
 Johan Galtung. On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions. World Politics 19, no. 03 (1967): 2
378-416.
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 When evaluating the success of sanctions, one of the first factors to examine is the type of 
sanctions being used. The type of sanctions must be taken into consideration when analysing their 
effectiveness. Besides banning or restricting certain types of import and export activities on the 
target state, existing literature has also looked into the freezing of assets and restricting transactions 
to weaken the target.  By limiting the import and export of goods, the local economy of a country is 3
affected. In some cases, however, the restriction of import and export activities can also lead to 
unintended side-effects. These include harming citizens rather than the elite, who are ultimately 
responsible for executing policy objectives and decisions. In cases like these, the sanctions do not 
coincide with the primary intentions for imposing them; furthermore, sanctions that unintentionally 
harm citizens can “conceivably (…) increase nationalistic resistance to outside pressure.”   4
 Financial sanctions have been granted a higher likelihood of success. Financial sanctions are 
seen to have more of a direct impact “on ruling elites by limiting their access to foreign currency.”  5
In accordance with this belief, Kaempfer and Loewenberg created a microeconomic model showing 
that financial sanctions are more likely to succeed if they “concentrate income losses on groups 
benefiting from the target policies.”  Adding to this model, Morgan and Schwebach state that the 6
elite is affected more by freezing foreign assets than by imposing import and export bans, because 
access to fundamental resources for the finances of the elite is immediately restricted.  7
 Possibly the next most important factor that influences the success of sanctions are the costs 
to the target. Drury and Doxey have argued that there is a correlation between the amount of target 
costs and the success of sanctions.  The costs imposed on target states potentially affect the states in 8
two stages: firstly, when sanctions are being threatened with, states can concede and secondly, once 
the sanctions are deployed, the costs can be so high that the target states are unable to fund them 
 Mahvash Alerassool, Freezing Assets: The USA and the Most Effective Economic Sanction. (1993).3
 Galtung, On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions. World Politics 19, no. 03 (1967): 378-416.4
 Jaleh Dashti-Gibson, Patricia Davis, and Benjamin Radcliff, On the Determinants of the Success of 5
Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis. American Journal of Political Science, (1997): 610.
 Ibid., 6106
 T. Clifton Morgan, and Valerie L. Schwebach, Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: The 7
Role of Domestic Politics. International Interactions 21, no. 3 (1995): 247-63.
 Navin A. Bapat, Tobias Heinrich, Yoshiharu Kobayashi, and T. Clifton Morgan, Determinants of Sanctions 8
Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data. International Interactions 39, no. 1 (2013): 79-98.
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and thus are forced to concede. In most cases observed in the literature, target states “did not relent 
even though they were facing the prospects of high costs of sanctions by international institutions.”  9
Using empirical evidence introduced by Morgan and Bapat called Threat and Imposition of 
Sanctions (hereafter TIES), their results also indicate that target costs positively correlate with the 
success of sanctions.  10
 The help from third countries by so-called black knights, limits the success of sanctions. 
Black knights can benefit from sanctioned states by providing extensive foreign aid. These third-
party states “respond to the imposition of sanctions by increasing their economic engagement with 
target states in ways that ameliorate the sanctions’ adverse consequences.”  Sanction scholars 11
assume that if sanctioned states can easily and “cost-effectively substitute the trade denied to them 
by sanctions”, they will be less inclined to comply to the sender-states’ demands.  If sanctions are 12
imposed on target states that are supported by black knights, the level of success is far less than if 
target states do not receive extensive aid from third-parties. Hufbauer et al. (hereafter HSE) have 
identified a correlation between the intervening black knights and the effectiveness and success of 
sanctions. According to HSE, “assistance to the target would make success an impossible goal.”  In 13
other words, sanctions are less likely to be effective if the country is supported by black knights that 
in turn profit from these sanctions. 
 Besides these three most important factors that must be considered when looking at the 
success of sanctions, there are more factors that could, in some cases, play an important role. The 
successful deployment of sanctions depends on the regime type of the target state. A regime’s 
domestic characteristics have a direct effect on how sanctions will affect the state. Economic 
sanctions on authoritarian or nationalist regime types have shown limited success when compared 
to states built on a liberal democracy.  In most cases, economic sanctions have almost never 14
successfully convinced an authoritarian regime to alter its political objectives. However, Morgan 
 Ibid., 79-989
 Ibid., 79-9810
 Bryan Early, Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of 11
Economic Sanctions (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015) 21.
 Ibid., 2112
 Cooper A. Drury. Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions: Models of Political Rationality 13
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)
 Atikur Rahman. Effectiveness of International Sanctions: Iran Perspective. International Journal of 14
Humanities & Social Science Studies: 137-43.
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and, using data from the TIES dataset, have argued that senders are likelier to obtain success when 
imposing sanctions if they themselves are democratic and the targets are not; this shows the 
importance of the regime-type.  15
 If sanctions have been imposed for a long time, the costs for the target-state will also be 
higher. This weakening of the target state is one of the objectives of sender states to employ 
sanctions. However, it can be argued that if sanctions are imposed for too long, the likeliness of 
success decreases. Dashti-Gibson et al. reason this by noting that “successful sanctions are imposed 
for a shorter period precisely because they have been effective and thus do not need to be 
continued.”  HSE concur, by stating that lengthy sanctions are likely to lead to “the waning 16
prospects of success.”   17
 Furthermore, studies have shown that imposing sanctions with maximum impact generally 
tend to be more successful. The longer the screw is turned, the higher the costs will be to deploy the 
sanctions and the more likely it is that target governments will be able to adapt to the sanctions. 
Thus, HSE have suggested to slam the hammer for an immediate, successful effect. The term “slam 
the hammer, don’t turn the screw” is then also linked to the duration and efficacy of sanctions.   18
 If sanctions are seen as a form of punishment, the outcome of the sanctions is less likely to 
be successful. If the target-state feels it is being punished, then there will be no cooperation between 
the sender- and the target-state.  This contrasts with the idea of smart sanctions. Weiss et al. 19
describe smart sanctions as “financial sanctions, travel bans, asset freezes, and arms embargoes”, all 
of which are used “as a means of persuasion rather than punishment so that the absolute level of 
economic costs may not matter as much as the costs in relation to demands in targeted areas.”  20
 According to a study conducted by Morgan and Bapat, institutional sanctions are more 
likely to be successful than unilateral sanctions. The level of success is dependent on how many 
issues are at stake and whether or not international institutions take part in the sanction-process. 
 Bapat, Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Morgan, Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis 15
Using New Data. 79-98.
 Dashti-Gibson, Davis and Radcliff, On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An 16
Empirical Analysis. American Journal of Political Science, (1997): 610.
 Ibid., 61017
 Gary Clyde Hufbauer. Sanctions Sometimes Succeed: But No All-Purpose Cure. CATO Unbound, 2014. 18
 Bernt Berger. Sanctions against North Korea: A Tricky Dilemma. European Union Institute for Security 19
Studies, 2015. 
 Geiguen Shin, Seung-Whan Choi, and Shali Luo. Do Economic Sanctions Impair Target Economies? PhD 20
diss., Missouri. Abstract in International Political Science Review.
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This debate stands in contrast to HSE, who in their extensive study suggested that unilateral 
sanctions are more effective than multilateral ones. In the scope of this thesis, however, the regime-
type, the duration of sanctions and the institutional deployment of sanctions are all similar and have 
therefore not contributed to the differing outcomes of success.  
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BACKGROUND 
Sanctions imposed on Iran date back to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, following a hostage crisis in 
Tehran. The U.S. froze assets related to the Iranian government until an accord was signed two 
years later, in which the sanctions were lifted.  Following statements by the U.S. Treasury in 1987 21
that the Iranian government was allegedly supporting “international terrorism and its aggressive 
actions against non-belligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf”, a new embargo was placed on Iranian 
goods. In the ten years that followed, almost all investment activities with Iran were banned by the 
U.S. government.   22
 Iran has been a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty since 1970 and as such accepted 
inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency of Development and Nuclear Facilities. In 
2003, it was publicly announced that Iran was developing uranium enrichment facilities and heavy-
water production plants. During the 80s and the 90s there was growing concern, particularly in the 
US, about the purpose of the nuclear activities of Iran. Iran claimed consistently that these activities 
served peaceful purposes. In fact, regular inspections by the IAEA confirmed this. However, a 
report by the Governors of the IAEA in 2005 stated that Iran was in not compliance with the 
requirements set by the IAEA. 
 Following this report, the Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iran in 2006, 
preventing “the import and export of all nuclear sensitive material” whilst simultaneously “freezing 
the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or 
the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.”  Since the first employment of Security 23
Council related sanctions on Iran, six resolutions (1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929) have 
been made by the Security Council, in which all obligations have been laid out for Iran to comply 
with.  The Security Council unanimously decided that the obligations would be terminated if Iran 24
“fully complied with its obligations, or adopt additional ones.”   25
 Josh Levs. A Summary of Sanctions against Iran. CNN. 2012. http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/23/world/21
meast/iran-sanctions-facts/. 
  Anthony H Cordesman. The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military 22
Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984.
 Security Council. Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt Uranium Enrichment, 23
Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1737 (2006) | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. UN News Center. 
2006. http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8928.doc.htm. 
 Kelsey Davenport. UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran. Arms Control Association. 2015. https://24
www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Security-Council-Resolutions-on-Iran. 
 Security Council, 200625
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 In January 2016, Iran signed a nuclear deal in which four pathways to build nuclear weapons 
have been blocked. Without the deal, it would take Iran two to three months to build a nuclear 
bomb, but with the deal, the facilities that enable the creation of such materials have been hindered. 
In short, “under the new nuclear deal, Iran has committed to extraordinary and robust monitoring, 
verification, and inspection,” leaving no room for a potential secret building of nuclear materials.  26
Dating back to 1950, North Korea has been faced with sanctions. In the context of the Korean War, 
the U.S. instituted a total embargo on all exports going to North Korea. In 1985, North Korea 
acceded to the Non Proliferation Treaty. In 1992, the IAEA visited North Korea for the first time, 
which led to the finding of “evidence of unreported plutonium production.”  Subsequently, its 27
inspectors were denied access to key sites. One month prior to its withdrawal from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty in 2003, North Korea reactivated its Yongbyon reactor whilst simultaneously 
preventing all IAEA inspectors from visiting.  
 In 2006, the Security Council started imposing sanctions on North Korea, after concerns 
were expressed regarding North Korean test launches that took place that same year. These launches 
set out to test ballistic missiles that not only posed a threat to the international community but also 
to “civilian aviation and shipping”.  In response to these concerns, the Security Council ordered 28
North Korea to immediately stop nuclear-related activities. Furthermore, it demanded its member 
states to “prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology being 
transferred to North Korea’s missile (…) programs.”  In order to prevent North Korean 29
proliferation of nuclear weapons, Resolution 1718 under Chapter VII of the Charter urged North 
Korea to “cease all launches and tests of nuclear and ballistic missiles, (…) provide the IAEA with 
transparency measures extending beyond the IAEA safeguards agreement to include access to 
individuals, documentation, equipment and facilities and abandon all other existing ballistic missile 
programs in a (…) verifiable and irreversible manner.”   30
 The Iran Nuclear Deal: What You Need To Know About The JCPOA. The White House Washington. 26
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/jcpoa_what_you_need_to_know.pdf. 
 Kenneth Katzman. Iran Sanctions. Congressional Research Service, 2016, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/27
mideast/RS20871.pdf. 35-40
 Clara Portela. The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted’ Sanctions. CEPS 391 (2014):  https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/28
WD391 Portela EU Targeted Sanctions.pdf. 27
 Ibid., 2729
 Ibid.30
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 Since the first deployment of economic sanctions in 2006, North Korea has conducted four 
nuclear-related tests, all of which have led to further tightening of the economic sanctions against 
North Korea. The primary difficulty with imposing sanctions on North Korea is the fact that North 
Korea “deems its nuclear programme to be essential for its national security (and therefore non-
negotiable).”  31
 Berger. Sanctions against North Korea: A Tricky Dilemma. 131
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JUSTIFICATION OF CASES / METHODOLOGY 
 Both Iran and North Korea have authoritarian regimes. This similarity has, however, not 
contributed to the different outcome of success. With the signing of the nuclear deal in 2016, it will 
be argued that the sanctions have successfully been imposed in Iran. In theory, it is easier to 
successfully impose sanctions on liberal democracies than on authoritarian regimes.  When 
president Ahmadinejad was still in power, he “adopted a stance of defiance rather than compliance” 
towards the sanctions.  However, since president Rouhani took the presidential position in 2013, 32
sanctions relief has been granted to Iran due to its acts of compliance. This does not imply that the 
regime has successfully been changed, but the strategic policies towards the development of its 
nuclear program have been altered, in order to be granted relief of certain sanctions. Though 
regime-change has, according to HSE, been an unstated goal in Iran, it still remains an authoritarian 
regime. However, the sanctions have led to compliance on Iran’s behalf, which can be counted as a 
success.  
 Like Iran, North Korea has an authoritarian regime. However, despite sanctions, it has 
continued to work on nuclear proliferation. Sanctions are aimed at isolating a target. Since the 
leadership of Kim Il-Sung, North Korean citizens have led an isolated life. Since the Korean War 
ended in 1953, its economy has been weak and underdeveloped and its citizens have never known 
basic needs. This has been a result of the sanctions against North Korea. To sanction a country 
means to take away the opportunity to obtain financial progress, triggering a change in behaviour 
that will grant the target-state these opportunities again. The North Korean regime has not been 
willing to grant its citizens such opportunities. North Korea’s geographical peninsula, along with its 
political authoritarian isolation, have made concessions difficult. The initial response to the 
sanctions has been one of great protest. For example, when North Korea launched a missile in 2009 
that constituted a clear violation of the prohibitions stated in Resolution 1718, the Security Council 
threatened to further tighten the sanctions. Instead of complying with it, the North Korean regime 
announced its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks, immediately “resuming its enrichment activities 
and expelling all nuclear inspectors”, which led to a further detonation of an underground nuclear 
 Gary Clyde, Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, Barbara Oegg. Economic Sanctions 32
Reconsidered, 3rd Edition. (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. 2009) 139.
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device.  These overreactions are central to North Korea’s regime, for they intend to “discredit 33
Seoul’s (…) conservative government and to (…) inflict harm on South Korea.”   34
 The internal dynamics of the state, especially against those in favour of breaking free from 
North Korea’s isolation and opening its borders are an example of its oppressive nature. Therefore, 
the tightening of sanctions is counterproductive because imposing stricter sanctions is perceived by 
the regime as “an opportunity to neutralise advocates” and to further enhance its nuclear program.  35
The foremost reason behind the ineffectiveness of sanctions against North Korea is “explained by 
the country’s status as the world’s most insular regime.”  36
 Even though Iran and North Korea are both authoritarian regimes, the outcomes of success 
are different. Therefore, the factor regime-type cannot be included in the analysis. 
As a result of the 1979 Revolution, the U.S. has deployed sanctions against Iran. For almost forty 
years, Iran’s economy has suffered, which has had direct humanitarian implications for the Iranian 
people. Early in 2016, a nuclear deal was signed, which has led to certain sanctions relief.  
 After decades of being faced with sanctions, the North Korean regime has “become adept at 
studying new sanctions and devising a particular method or practice that minimises their effect.”  37
As the literature has stated, empirical evidence shows that the longer sanctions are being imposed, 
the less effective they are likely to be. The Security Council imposed sanctions on North Korea 
immediately after its first successful nuclear testing in 2006. Similarly, Iran has also been 
sanctioned by the Security Council since 2006.  
 The idea that sanctions are a means to punish the target-state has not led to a change in 
behaviour of the North Korean regime. North Korea has long considered itself as being a punished 
state in a broader conflict and therefore has not changed its strategic approach regarding nuclear 
proliferation. Its primary objective for developing nuclear weapons “serves as a means of ensuring 
the survival of both the nation and the regime.”  Therefore, the sanctioning over a period of 38
decades, has led to a different outcome than in Iran. Iran has signed a nuclear deal, yet North Korea 
 Portela. The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted’ Sanctions. 3033
 Ibid. 3034
 Ibid.35
 Ibid.36
 John S. Park. The Key to the North Korean Targeted Sanctions Puzzle. The Elliott School of International 37
Affairs, 2014, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Park_Fall2014.pdf. 
199-214.
 Berger. Sanctions against North Korea: A Tricky Dilemma. 438
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continues to build its nuclear arsenal. The fact that both states have been targeted by sanctions for 
several decades therefore offers no explanation for the successful imposition of sanctions in Iran 
and the unsuccessful deployment in North Korea.  
 Empirical studies have shown that institutional sanctions are generally more successful than 
unilateral ones. Both states have been subject to institutional sanctions. U.S. sanctions on Iran have 
been broader than UN sanctions. The U.S. sanctions were initially aimed at terrorism and human 
rights abuse, whilst UN sanctions have focused almost solely on Iran’s nuclear proliferation. The 
combination of being sanctioned on different fronts has clearly affected Iran’s regime and economy. 
 Since 2006, the institutionalised sanctions have led to a decline in Iran’s GDP, reducing it by 
15-20%. As a result of the involvement of the UN, Iran’s oil exports were no longer financed by 
hard currency. Also, since the ban on the import of nuclear-related material, Iran’s industrial sector 
has experienced considerable difficulties. Furthermore, restrictive measures imposed in 2012 on 
arms, nuclear missiles, the financial sector, travel bans and asset freezes have caused great harm to 
the Iranian economy. With the lifting of most of these sanctions since the nuclear deal, the Iranian 
economy will be able to restore most of these sectors. 
 In the case of North Korea, the UN-led institutional sanctions have had little to no effect on 
North Korea’s attitude towards its nuclear programme. The prime difficulties of successfully 
employing sanctions in North Korea are due to two things: firstly, the state’s isolation and secondly, 
the general belief that sanctions are aimed solely at changing the North Korean regime. In other 
words, the Security Council-led institutional sanctions can do no more than “add a thin layer of 
supplementary distress, far from sufficient to sway a leadership that does not know what it is not to 
be under sanctions.”   39
 With these institutional sanctions, existing measures have been strengthened by the addition 
of newer sanctions. By both being sanctioned by the U.S. and the Security Council, the institutional 
factor is held constant; however, the outcome is different and can, just like the regime-type and the 
duration of sanctions, not be used in the analysis. 
 Portela. The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted’ Sanctions. 3139
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ANALYSIS 
I. IRAN 
TYPE OF SANCTIONS 
The Security Council’s reason for economically sanctioning Iran was motivated by Iran reworking 
its uranium enrichment program in 2006. Unlike the U.S.-led sanctions against Iran, the UN 
sanctions have never intended to “prohibit member states from (…) exporting food, medicine or 
humanitarian goods to Iran.”  Rather, the UN sanctions are narrower because the prime focus is on 40
prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since 2006, Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, 1884, 
1929 and 2049 have been passed. In these resolutions, an embargo on all enrichment-related 
materials was agreed, along with a direct ban on any activities related to heavy-water materials and 
the enhancement of developing nuclear materials.  Individuals and entities associated with any 41
nuclear-related developments received a visa- and travel ban, and all assets were frozen. Any arms 
supplied to Iran, as well as all non-humanitarian-related loans granted were prohibited. Uranium 
mining and the development of nuclear technological advancements abroad were banned, thus 
allowing member states of the Security Council to both monitor, intervene, capture and get rid of 
materials related to nuclear activities travelling to Iran in Resolution 1803. Resolution 1929 
“banned Iran from acquiring interests in any commercial activity in another state involving uranium 
mining, production or use of nuclear materials.” Anything related to combat vehicles or artillery 
was banned.  42
 Iran’s energy sector has not directly been targeted, but Resolution 1929 does note a 
“potential connection between Iran’s revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of 
Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.”  However, the financial measures that have been 43
taken in freezing assets and financial transactions with banks overseas have made Iranian oil sales 
 "Resource Center." Iran Sanctions. https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/40
iran.aspx. 
 Portela. The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted’ Sanctions. 3241
 Ibid., 2142
 Katzman. Iran Sanctions. 35-4043
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drop by 40%.  Furthermore, the Central Bank of Iran has been sanctioned, cutting off the SWIFT 44
service in which financial transactions are made internationally.  
TARGET COSTS 
The so-called “punishment theory” suggests that, if the degree of economic harm inflicted on a 
target state leads to domestic pressure, those ruling are obliged to “comply with external 
demands.”  The judgement of whether sanctions are successful is based on the severity of the 45
economic harm caused to the target-state. In the case of Iran, serious economic sanctions were 
imposed that largely weakened the state’s economy. They forced the regime to comply in order to 
be granted sanctions relief. In 2011, two-and-a-half million barrels of crude oil were exported daily. 
In 2012, the European Union imposed a total oil embargo on Iran. Therefore, by 2013, the export 
had halved, going down to just over one million barrels a day. Also, the unemployment rate was 
estimated at 20% in 2013.  Due to the previously imposed resolutions, approximately $120 billion 46
in bank reserves were not accessible. This led to a shrinkage of the Iranian economy up until 
2014.  Esfandiary and Fitzpatrick identified the financial-related sanctions as those that have had 47
the starkest impact on Iran’s economy.  Inflation-rates keep rising and most recently stood at 48
22.2%, though experts have claimed these figures to be underestimated.  The entire economy 49
underwent a shrinkage of 9% by late 2014, only to start stabilising in 2015 once the first sanction 
reliefs took place. 
 At first, the strong impact the sanctions had on the Iranian economy did not discourage the 
regime to continue its development of nuclear materials. In fact, “Teheran regarded the cost of 
sanctions as the price to be paid to allow it to conduct its anti-hegemonic foreign policy, while it 
presented the nuclear programme as a symbol of national technological and scientific progress, of 
 Ibid., 35-4044
 Julia Grauvogel, and Christian Von Soest. Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate 45
Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes. Eur J Polit Res European Journal of Political Research (2013) 
https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp235_grauvogel-soest.pdf. 6
 Portela. The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted’ Sanctions. 2446
 Katzman. Iran Sanctions. 35-4047
 Portela. The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted’ Sanctions. 3348
 Sabrina M. Peterson. Iran's Deteriorating Economy: An Analysis of the Economic Impact of Western 49
Sanctions. International Affairs Review. http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/428. 
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Iranian ambitions toward leadership in the region and of its resistance to the global arrogance of 
external powers.”  The actual costs these sanctions have induced on the Iranian economy have 50
strongly impacted the Iranian state. Declining oil revenues, rising inflation, growing unemployment 
and the need to rely on middlemen to conduct international financial transactions, have made it 
increasingly difficult for Iran to work on the development of its nuclear arsenal.  
 The preamble of Resolution 1929 in 2006 clearly stated that sanctions would be lifted if Iran 
would comply with the targeted demands. The weakened economy led to internal pressure of the 
Iranian population to comply with the sanctions in order to be granted sanctions relief. According to 
the World Bank, this would boost the economy by $15 billion.  51
 Besides the financial implications the sanctions have had, humanitarian impacts have largely 
affected Iran too. Because the transfer of hard currency was made impossible, Iranian people were 
unable to receive medical supplies. As a result, 23,000 Iranians living with AIDS have not been 
granted the necessary medical treatment, causing numerous deaths.  52
 Because of the damage that was inflicted upon Iran’s economy, compliance with the 
demands of the imposed sanctions was necessary. By accepting the conditions set in the sanctions’ 
objectives, Iran has since been able to strengthen its economy again whilst working towards 
sanctions relief and, most recently, the nuclear deal.  
BLACK KNIGHTS 
Many states that have been targeted by sanctions have relied on the help of intermediaries or, black 
knights, to continue transactions that enable trade. In the case of Iran, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) have played an important role. The trade that has developed between Iran and the UAE is 
“mainly driven by profits instead of politics”.  As a result of the first U.S. sanctions that were 53
imposed after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the UAE increased its “legitimate and illicit trade 
 Ibid., 2450
 Elena Ianchovichina, Shantayanan Devarajan, and Csilla Lakatos. Lifting Economic Sanctions on Iran. 51
Global Effects and Strategic Responses. World Bank Group, 2016. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/
default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2016/02/01/090224b08412519c/1_0/Rendered/PDF/
Lifting0econom00strategic0responses.pdf. 
 Julian Borger, and Saeed K. Dehghan. Iran Unable to Get Life-saving Drugs Due to International 52
Sanctions. The Guardian. 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/13/iran-lifesaving-drugs-
international-sanctions.  
 Early, Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of Economic 53
Sanctions. 88.
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with Iran” in an environment that created new trade opportunities.  Following the first series of 54
sanctions on Iran, Dubai became a leading venue for Iranian merchants to acquire American goods. 
By 1980, smugglers were transferring “15.000 tons a day of essential commodities to Iran”.  55
During Iran’s war with Iraq, the UAE - contrary to other Arab states - maintained a good 
relationship with Iran. When the U.S. imposed tighter sanctions on Iran in the late 1980’s, Iran was 
able to make use of trading routes and networks established with the UAE, in order to avoid the 
harsh impact of economic sanctions. 
Faced with tightened UN sanctions against Iran’s oil import and export, Iran signed contracts with 
relatively small oil companies from Malaysia and Qatar. Through creating contracts with smaller 
companies that did not fall under UN sanctions, Iran was still able to import substantial amounts of 
gasoline. Furthermore, the sanctioned carriers transporting good such as petrochemicals by sea were 
substituted by smaller companies that would perform the same job for a commission that could go 
up to 30% of the transaction costs. Banks such as the Iranian Central Bank were sanctioned and 
international financial transactions were banned, making Iran rely on gold instead of conducting 
payments through bank transactions. A prominent recipient of Iran’s payments in “yellow metal” 
was Dubai.   56
 For a sender-state to successfully impose sanctions on a target-state, the intervention of 
black knights is a challenge for the success of the sanctions. When sanctioning a target-state, the 
objective is to isolate that state in return for compliance with the given sanctions. If, however, a 
target-state can still conduct import and export in order to facilitate its nuclear proliferation, the 
efficacy of sanctions is undermined. Despite the aid of small firms acting as intermediaries, Iran’s 
economy had been fundamentally harmed; the only means to restore this damage was to eventually 
comply in order to be granted sanctions relief. 
Although the UAE provided a means to continue trade with Iran and bust U.S. sanctions to some 
degree, Early suggests that “UAE’s sanctions busting certainly did not convince the U.S. 
 Ibid., 9654
 Ibid., 10055
 Valentin Katasonov . The «Black Knights» Are the Partisan Fighters in an Economic War. Strategic 56
Culture Foundation. 2015.
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government to give up on its efforts”.  These efforts were picked up by the Security Council in 57
2006 and have since led to the signing of the nuclear deal in 2016.  
CONCLUSION 
Iran has been subject to substantial sanctions ever since 1979. With the introduction of institutional, 
multilateral sanctions since 2006, Iran’s nuclear proliferation programme has been challenged and 
its economy has suffered, too. The question still remains, however: have sanctions against Iran been 
successful?  
In 2013 President Rouhani was elected; he soon reached an interim agreement with the P5+1 that 
would ease the sanctions. It is essential to note, that the U.S. had started secret talks with Iran in 
March 2013. This represented a breakthrough for the U.S. at the risk of upsetting one of its key 
allies in the Middle East, Israel.  In this agreement, signed in Geneva in 2013, Iran acknowledged 58
that its uranium enrichment would be neutralised and no further construction would be done on 
centrifuges or heavy-water-related materials. Also, IAEA inspections were granted on a daily 
basis.  Instead of enriching its uranium up to 20%, Iran now enriches to 3.5%; because of this, 59
sanctions have been eased “on a temporary and reversible basis.”  Furthermore, the sanctions relief 60
package has allowed Iran to repatriate $4.2 billion of export revenues that, under the sanctions, were 
not accessible. The petrochemical industry has been re-opened, granting Iran exports that amount to 
approximately $2 billion annually.   61
 On July 14th 2015, a comprehensive nuclear accord was finalised. The accord “provides 
broad sanctions relief from U.S., UN, and multilateral sanctions on Iran’s energy, financial, and 
shipping sectors.”  Iran has complied with the commitments and since January 16th, 2016, the 62
sanctions relief program has been in place. The commitments include a limitation of the production 
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of centrifuges to 5,060 a year, which contrasts the 20,000 it had prior to the accord. Furthermore, 
“Iran's uranium stockpile will also be reduced by 98% to 300kg (660lbs) for 15 years” and Iran’s 
heavy-water building facilities will be redesigned so that no nuclear materials can be produced in 
the future.   63
 In the accord, it has also been agreed that, should there be any violation of the commitments, 
the sanctions will immediately be put into place again for potentially another fifteen years. With its 
compliance, Iran has been granted the possibility to “freely export crude oil and to access its foreign 
exchange reserves held in foreign banks” which accounts for approximately $60 billion.  64
The signing of the nuclear deal between Iran on the one hand and the permanent five members of 
the Security Council along with the EU on the other hand shows that the harsh employment of 
sanctions have led Iran to re-evaluate its strategic purposes and to agree to abstain from further 
nuclear proliferation. In return for its compliance, it has been granted the freedom to have access to 
import materials and international transaction deals. The lifting of the sanctions will primarily boost 
the economy. The shrunken economy is, according to the World Bank, estimated to grow by just 
under 4% due to renewed access to financial and transport trade services.  65
 BBC News. Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details. BBC News. 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-63
east-33521655.
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II. NORTH KOREA 
The reason for sanctioning North Korea differs slightly from Iran. The Security Council adopted 
sanctions as a direct response to North Korea’s first two conducted nuclear tests. The main objective 
was to oblige North Korea to discard its nuclear program and to re-join the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, after it withdrew from it in 2003.  Herein lies an important difference between Iran and 66
North Korea. Iran is still part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has always claimed its nuclear 
program is solely for peaceful ends. North Korea, on the contrary, has withdrawn from the treaty 
and has conducted four nuclear tests since 2006. The ultimate target is to completely denuclearise 
North Korea.  
TYPE OF SANCTIONS 
The Security Council has passed five resolutions since the first nuclear tests were conducted in 
2006. The objective has been to have Pyongyang “dismantle its nuclear program in a complete, 
verifiable and irreversible manner.”  Resolution 1718 was adopted in response to the first ballistic 67
missile tests in 2006. The resolution set out to suspend all nuclear-related activities and efforts; it 
for the first time imposed sanctions that go against the development of nuclear materials. The 
import and export of goods, such as “battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery 
systems, combat aircraft (…) missiles or missile systems” was also banned.  Alongside the 68
prohibition of import and export of these goods, states have to inspect all cargo that could 
potentially be carrying nuclear material into North Korea. Furthermore, assets were frozen and 
individuals who had a direct- or indirect involvement in the nuclear program were banned from 
travelling. However, China, as a black knight and ally of North Korea, has not fully taken part in 
such inspections. 
 Resolution 1874 was adopted in 2009, following a second nuclear test in May that same 
year. This resolution tightened the already-existing sanctions from Resolution 1718. The list of 
banned goods was expanded as well as the individuals banned from travelling. The Security 
Council’s member states had the right to delay cargo travels going to North Korea, allowing them to 
 The Guardian. North Korea Withdraws from Nuclear Treaty. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/66
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“inspect and destroy any cargo (…) suspected of violating the arms embargo.”  Furthermore, all 69
foreign loans to North Korea could only be made for humanitarian purposes.  
 In reaction to a successful satellite launch in 2012, the Security Council imposed new 
sanctions in Resolution 2087. This Resolution demanded the immediate compliance of North Korea 
with the resolutions of 2006 and 2009, “including that it abandon all nuclear weapons and nuclear 
programs completely, verifiably and irreversibly.”  The tightening of previous sanctions took place, 70
along with a clear threat that significant actions would be taken if North Korea would once more 
not oblige with their imposed sanctions. In response to Resolution 2087, North Korea launched yet 
another nuclear test, leading to the adoption of Resolution 2094 in March 2013.   71
 Resolution 2094’s prime objective was to hinder North Korea’s access to “hard cash and 
technological equipment”, which was necessary for the development and production of uranium 
enrichment programs.  Links to international financial banking systems were restricted and the list 72
of (luxury) goods and materials that were to be banned from import was expanded. 
 Nevertheless, in January 2016 North Korea conducted its forth nuclear test. UN member 
states have since been prohibited “from opening new financial institutions (…) in North Korea and 
are required to terminate existing joint ventures” almost immediately after the resolution was 
adopted.  All economic resources found to be located- and owned outside of North Korea 73
underwent an asset freeze, whilst travel bans were further expanded. 
 In March 2016, the UN passed Resolution 2270 which “appears to be aimed more at 
inducing severe economic dislocation or even collapse.”  All coal and iron exports are prohibited, 74
along with the “export of gold, titanium ore (…) and rare earth materials”, all of which account for 
most of North Korea’s export.  75
 Since almost a decade, smart sanctions against North Korea’s former leader Kim Jong-Il and 
his successor Kim Jong-Un have been imposed. Specifically the ban on luxury goods was directly 
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targeted at the leaders, for their weak spot for luxurious goods, such as Hennessy, motorcycles and 
hi-tech televisions is generally known.  The Security Council resolution banning the import of 76
luxury goods did not narrowly define what was to be understood by luxury, thus enabling the late 
Kim Jong-Il and his son Kim Jong-Un to find plenty of alternatives to circumvent the sanctions. 
The luxury goods that, through smuggling, found their way to the leaders, were not distributed to 
the people, therefore keeping them oppressed and underprivileged. 
Yet, despite the range of sanctions that the Security Council has imposed on North Korea in the past 
decade, North Korea continuous to conduct nuclear tests. The Security Council’s prime objective 
has been to completely denuclearise its target, but in reality and regardless of on-going sanctions, 
little has changed in the regime’s determination to enhance its development program.  
TARGET COSTS 
As a result of sanctions, North Korea has suffered financial and humanitarian costs. In 2016 alone, 
the Food and Agricultural Organisation (hereafter FAO) estimated that North Korea needs over 400 
thousand tons of food, but as a result of the sanctions, it has thus far only been given just under 18 
thousand. This could result in another famine, like the previous one, known as the Arduous March 
in 1994, which killed over four million people. Under the current sanctions, humanitarian aid 
provided by NGOs is blocked. This results in a lack of “provision of nutritional supplements to 
malnourished children; the treatment of infectious diseases (…) and the delivery of basic 
medicines.”  People are starving, but the elite is not being harmed. As a result of being sanctioned, 77
North Korea continues to be "incapable of supplying the North Korean population adequate food 
due to unfavourable agricultural conditions, ecological damage, and planning irrationalities.”  As a 78
result, approximately 70% of the population has no food security. The sanctions have led to 
continuous deficits in energy and a crumbling infrastructure that could potentially lead to another 
humanitarian disaster. 
 Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition. 139.76
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BLACK KNIGHTS 
The presence of sanction busters, or black knights, make it difficult for sanctions to effectively 
work. The geographical isolation of North Korea’s peninsula as well as the isolation of its strategic 
regime has made North Korea highly dependent on foreign aid. Particularly the Soviet Union and 
the People’s Republic of China have played a significant role in supporting the sanctioned state. 
According to Early, North Korea was highly dependent on aid from the Soviet Union in the 1980s, 
but with its collapse came “a devastating impact on North Korea’s economy and basic ability to 
even feed its own citizens.”  With North Korea being sanctioned and relying heavily on the support 79
of third-party states, the Soviet collapse gave way for China to fill the gap and start providing aid to 
North Korea. The relationship between North Korea and China has not been one of constant trade-
flow, but “it has consistently been a leading source of food aid and broader foreign assistance” for 
the regime.  China’s influence has proven to be a vital factor in the preservation of an isolated 80
North Korea. Jaweoo Choo even noted that “If Chinese aid did not make up the majority of North 
Korea’s deficiencies (…) the North Korean economy and perhaps the life of the nation, would have 
earlier come to an end.”  An estimated 510,000 tons of food have been delivered to North Korea 81
annually, which, despite the Arduous March, kept the regime standing. North Korea does not solely 
rely on China for food support, but also for fuel and materials used for the construction of factories. 
With other trade-flow having largely been banned, China’s sanction busting accounted for 84% of 
the North Korean trade.  82
Through the high level of bilateral activities between North Korea and China and the expanding 
Chinese economy, North Korea has had ample opportunity to benefit from financial aid. Despite 
sanctions, approximately $6 billion worth of bilateral trade between North Korea and China was 
reported in 2011 alone. The reason China continues to support North Korea is largely to protect its 
own strategic interests; this makes the efficacy of sanctions against North Korea negligible.  China 83
wants to preserve a buffer state between itself and South Korea (a U.S. ally).  
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CONCLUSION 
Looking at the sanctions imposed on North Korea, DeThomas has suggested that these have not 
been proportional to the objectives they were meant to obtain. According to his study, the sanctions 
that have been in place since 2006 assumed “that a marginal negative shift in the balance of costs of 
the (…) nuclear programme compared to what Pyongyang could gain from negotiating it away 
would be sufficient to compel a change in North Korean nuclear policy.”  This has led to the 84
ineffectiveness of the sanctions that have hitherto been imposed. Instead of re-evaluating the policy 
strategies of the senders, he proposes a new strategic context. In the light of slamming the hammer 
and not turning the screw, DeThomas has suggested that the sanctions that have been imposed 
against North Korea have been more like “hammers without nails”.  85
DeThomas primarily argues that sanctions an sich can be an effective tool to coerce a target-state. 
However, “the current sanctions are inappropriate and overmatched.”  Surely, the employment of 86
sanctions have imposed great costs on the North Korean economy, but the sanctions are seen to be 
disproportionate to achieve the objective they were designed for - denuclearisation. To halt 
proliferation, sanctions were imposed to raise the costs of developing a nuclear programme and 
access to external financial aid was frozen. Instead, the people of North Korea have suffered rather 
than the elite. The biggest difficulty in halting North Korea’s nuclear program has been China’s 
sanction busting role. Only if China were to fully commit “to strong sanctions on key economic 
lifelines” could a shift in North Korea’s nuclear policy be an option.  This is, however, not a 87
realistic option yet.  
By considering a new strategic concept, potential means can be found to enhance the efficacy of 
sanctions. Firstly, the senders - in this case the US and UN - must reconsider their objectives and 
secondly, the tools used to achieve these objectives must be looked at. Changing the North Korean 
regime would likely mean a complete eradication of the regime, which is an objective that is seen as 
being too expensive for senders to consider. A foremost change in strategy would be to introduce 
 Joseph DeThomas. "Sanctions’ Role in Dealing with the North Korean Problem." SAIS, 2016. http://84
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the idea of nuclear deterrence again. By presenting this option Kim Jong Un, a reconsideration of its 
proliferation could follow. If North Korea were to continue its nuclear developments, it would still 
“be a weak nation with primitive strategic forces and (…) primitive early warning and command 
and control capabilities.”  Containing North Korea’s nuclear program through banning the import 88
and export of nuclear-related materials is only possible if, like Iran, it would allow inspections on 
sites. Given its isolated position, this remains an unlikely outcome. 
In the light of this new strategic context, the application of sanctions poses a predicament to the 
success of sanctions. The negative impact sanctions have hitherto had are in part due to the North 
Korean elite’s ability to severely punish its own population. The existing sanctions should be 
tightened and more targeted towards the elite. The sanctions would be used “in response to 
significantly important actions directly threatening (…) vital interests (…) of the international 
community.”  The sanctions would have to have an impact so large and so quick - i.e. slamming 89
the hammer -, that their employment could potentially lead to war. Further sanctions that could be 
effective would be to impose an international embargo comparable to that used against South 
Africa. The embargo against South Africa led to successful denuclearisation. Without the support of 
China, however, an international ban on import and export of fuel and freezing all international 
financial transactions in the form of a further Security Council resolution, such harsh sanctions are 
not feasible. DeThomas suggests that Chinese cooperation could be more likely if such sanctions 
would only be deployed in response to North Korean use of nuclear weapons.  The outlook of a 90
potential escalation of a nuclear war bordering China could alter the passivity of Chinese 
cooperation with sanctions, thus eliminating China’s interest in profiting from its position as a black 
knight. 
In short, a targeted strategy of deterrence towards North Korea’s nuclear programme must be 
considered when re-evaluating the inefficacy of sanctions thus far. If the threat of deterrence is so 
harsh that it could lead to a nuclear war, which would indirectly harm China too, the North Korean 
proliferation program could be delayed and sanctions could lead to success. Currently, however, this 
is not the case.  
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CONCLUSION 
To conclude, both Iran and North Korea are states that have been targeted by institutional 
sanctions for decades. With the development of nuclear activities, the U.S. and Security 
Council have sanctioned both regimes in order to halt nuclear proliferation. In 2016, Iran 
came to a nuclear agreement that led to sanctions relief; however, despite economic and 
domestic suffering, North Korea continues its nuclear developments.  
The goal of sanctioning a state is to isolate it in order to trigger a change in behaviour. Prior 
to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran was a prosperous country with a rich culture. The 
people, therefore, had something to lose once sanctions hit Iran. 
 Iran has been a signatory of the NPT since 1970 and as such had accepted inspections 
by the IAEA of its nuclear facilities. It always claimed that its nuclear program served 
peaceful purposes. When an IAEA report in 2005 stated non-compliance with Safety 
Requirements, the UN Security Council started imposing economic sanctions in 2006. 
 The economic sanctions had a demonstrable impact on the Iranian economy: e.g a 
severe drop in trade, a sharp rise in unemployment, the freezing of foreign assets, and a 
dramatic reduction in oil revenues. By 2013, a more outward looking and reform-minded 
regime took power. The correlation with the effect of the sanctions could be made. All these 
factors contributed to Iran getting ready to come to the table. 
 However, in order to arrive at a breakthrough, the super powers - the P5+1 - needed 
to have their strategic interests aligned as well. Russia and China had maintained diplomatic 
relations with Iran, but the US had cut-off relations since 1979. The decision by the Unites 
States to start secret talks with Iran in 2013, at the risk of upsetting its key ally in the Middle 
East Israel, represented a courageous and decisive step forward. The strategic interests of 
the super powers were now more aligned, possibly also in view of serious concerns over the 
growing chaos and instability in the Middle East.  
 The effect of economic sanctions and a change in regime on the target state on the 
one side and the alignment of strategic interests of the key sender states on the other side led 
to a successful nuclear accord. 
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 This stands in contrast with North Korea - also an authoritarian regime, but one that 
feels it must defend its national sovereignty by defending itself with a nuclear arsenal. North 
Korea acceded to the Non Proliferation Treaty in 1985, but withdrew in 2003. North Korea 
and South Korea are still officially at war. The North Korean regime views the sanctions as 
an attempt to trigger regime change and as an infringement on its right to defend itself 
against its enemies.  These principles are non-negotiable for the regime and therefore 
materially impact the efficacy of the sanctions.  
 Moreover, and very importantly, North Korea is a regime that has known isolation 
for many years, regardless of sanctions.  China has a different strategic interest in North 
Korea than the other super powers. China wants to preserve a buffer state between itself  
and US supported South Korea.  The sanction busting aid of China has made the 
effectiveness of sanctions difficult, for it has been shown that China has provided up to 84% 
of North Korea’s trade. Had China not acted as a black knight, the sanctions might have 
worked. 
 Iran’s nuclear deal is a benchmark that demonstrates the effect that sanctions have 
had. President Rouhani’s election in 2013 brought a shift in Iran’s nuclear policy and has 
since worked towards compliance and sanctions relief. This way, the economy and Iran’s 
trade will be able to rebuild its ravaged economy in the coming years. Though the UAE has 
busted sanctions for Iran, the economic and humanitarian suffering did not outweigh the 
benefits of continuing its nuclear proliferation. 
North Korea, on the other hand, has shown little compliance. The geopolitical peninsula has 
not been isolated as a result of sanctions, thus the imposition of sanctions can be seen as 
almost redundant. 
 When considering the factors that contribute to the success of sanctions, the duration 
of sanctions, regime-type and institutional sanctions shared similarities between the cases 
and so could not contribute to the differing outcomes of success. The differences lie in the 
type of sanctions, the target costs and black knights. Also, it is important to  take the role 
and the strategic interests of the superpowers –the likely black knights - into account as 
well: the US stepped forward with Iran and China is unlikely to change its support for North 
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Korea. North Korea’s heavy reliance on the aid of third-parties has given it the strength to 
resist sanctions. 
!27
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Literature 
Alerassool, Mahvash. Freezing Assets: The USA and the Most Effective Economic Sanction. 1993. 
Bapat, Navin A., Tobias Heinrich, Yoshiharu Kobayashi, and T. Clifton Morgan. Determinants of 
Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data. International Interactions 39, no. 1 
(2013): 79-98. 
Berger, Bernt. Sanctions against North Korea: A Tricky Dilemma. European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, 2015. 
Borger, Julian, and Saeed Kamali Dehghan. Iran Unable to Get Life-saving Drugs Due to 
International Sanctions. The Guardian. 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/13/iran-
lifesaving-drugs-international-sanctions. 
Campbell, Emma. North Korea Sanctions Punish the Whole Population. East Asia Forum. 2013. 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/10/north-korea-sanctions-punish-the-whole-population/. 
Cordesman, Anthony H. The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military 
Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1984. 
Dashti-Gibson, Jaleh, Patricia Davis, and Benjamin Radcliff. On the Determinants of the Success of 
Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis. American Journal of Political Science, April 1997, 
610. 
Davenport, Kelsey. UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran. Arms Control Association. 2015. 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Security-Council-Resolutions-on-Iran. 
DeThomas, Joseph. "Sanctions’ Role in Dealing with the North Korean Problem." SAIS, 2016. 
http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/NKNF-DeThomas-Sanctions-Role.pdf. 
Drury, A. Cooper. Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions: Models of Political Rationality. 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
Early, Brian. Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of 
Economic Sanctions. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015. 
Elich, Gregory. UN Sanctions Designed to Impose Suffering on the North Korean People. Global 
Research. 2016. 
Galtung, Johan. On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case 
of Rhodesia. World Pol. World Politics 19, no. 03 (1967): 378-416. 
Grauvogel, Julia, and Christian Von Soest. Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to 
Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes. Eur J Polit Res European Journal of Political 
!28
Research 53, no. 4 (2014): 635-53. https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/
wp235_grauvogel-soest.pdf. 
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde. Sanctions Sometimes Succeed: But No All-Purpose Cure. CATO Unbound, 
2014. 
Gary Clyde, Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, Barbara Oegg. Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered, 3rd Edition. (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. 2009) 
139. 
Ianchovichina, Elena, Shantayanan Devarajan, and Csilla Lakatos. Lifting Economic Sanctions on 
Iran. Global Effects and Strategic Responses. World Bank Group, 2016. http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/
2016/02/01/090224b08412519c/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Lifting0econom00strategic0responses.pdf. 
Katasonov, Valentin. The «Black Knights» Are the Partisan Fighters in an Economic War. Strategic 
Culture Foundation. 2015. 
Katzman, Kenneth. Iran Sanctions. Congressional Research Service, 2016, 35-40. https://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf. 
Levs, Josh. A Summary of Sanctions against Iran. CNN. 2012. http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/23/
world/meast/iran-sanctions-facts/. 
Morgan, T. Clifton, and Valerie L. Schwebach. Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Foreign 
Policy: The Role of Domestic Politics. International Interactions 21, no. 3 (1995): 247-63. 
Pape, Robert A. Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 
90. 
Park, John S. The Key to the North Korean Targeted Sanctions Puzzle. The Elliott School of 
International Affairs, 2014, 199-214. https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/
downloads/Park_Fall2014.pdf. 
Peterson, Sabrina M. Iran's Deteriorating Economy: An Analysis of the Economic Impact of 
Western Sanctions. International Affairs Review. http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/428. 
Portela, Clara. The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted’ Sanctions. CEPS 391 (2014): 27. https://www.ceps.eu/
system/files/WD391 Portela EU Targeted Sanctions.pdf. 
Rahman, K. M. Atikur. Effectiveness of International Sanctions: Iran Perspective. International 
Journal of Humanities & Social Science Studies: 137-43. 
Shin, Geiguen, Seung-Whan Choi, and Shali Luo. Do Economic Sanctions Impair Target 
Economies? PhD diss., Missouri. Abstract in International Political Science Review. 
!29
Websites 
"Inside the Secret U.S.-Iran Diplomacy That Sealed Nuke Deal." US News. 2015. http://
www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/12/inside-the-secret-us-iran-diplomacy-that-sealed-nuke-
deal. 
Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details. BBC News. 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-33521655.  
North Korea Withdraws from Nuclear Treaty. The Guardian. 2003. http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2003/jan/10/northkorea1. 
"Resource Center." Iran Sanctions. https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/
pages/iran.aspx. 
Security Council Condemns Use of Ballistic Missile Technology in Launch by Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, in Resolution 2087 (2013) | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. UN News 
Center. 2013. http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10891.doc.htm. 
Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously 
Adopting Resolution 1737 (2006) | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. UN News Center. 2006. 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8928.doc.htm. 
The Iran Nuclear Deal: What You Need To Know About The JCPOA. The White House   
Washington. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
jcpoa_what_you_need_to_know.pdf  . 
